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In this paper I argue for an ethics of machines. In arguing for an ethics of machines I am not only 
arguing for the consideration of the ethical implications of machines (which we already do) but also, 
and more importantly, for an ethics of machines qua machines, as such. Thus, I attempt to argue for 
a decentering of ethics, urging us to move beyond any centre, whatever it may be—anthropological, 
biological, etc. I argue that if we take ethics seriously we must admit that our only measure cannot 
be that of man.  To develop the argument I use an episode in Star Trek where the fate of the highly 
sophisticated android Commander Data is to be decided. I show how the moral reasoning about 
Data remains anthropocentric but with some attempt to reach beyond it. I proceed to use the work of 




Increasingly we find ourselves surrounded by machines.1 As we draw on, and become dependent on 
the possibilities they provide, the boundary between our machines and us are becoming less and less 
obvious. What is a soldier without the technology of global positioning, night vision, laser guided 
telescopes, mobile telecoms, and more? What is the detective without the detecting technology of 
genetic profiling, fingerprint matching, voice recognition, bugging, and so forth? Is a soldier really a 
soldier without his kit? It seems that his kit is becoming integral to what he is, as soldier. As society 
develops we are putting more of ourselves ‘in’ machines (depending on them to make decisions we 
use to make), and machines are increasingly ‘inserting themselves’ into us (as artificial limbs or 
extensions of ourselves), doing very important things we use to do for ourselves. At the end of the 
progression we have the android and the cyborg. We are becoming, always have been, 
human/machine hybrids (Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1993). As we progress along this path, which 
already started with the first tools, and without out wanting to speculate about the inevitability of 
such a progression or how rapid or slow this may be, it will certainly become increasingly important 
for us to consider the ethics of machines.   
When referring the ‘ethics of machines’, I am referring to it in two very distinct ways. In 
the first, more traditional sense, I mean the values and interests built into the very materiality of the 
machines we draw upon—inscribed in their ‘flesh’ as it were (Winner, 1980). In drawing upon the 
possibilities presented by these machines we become wittingly or unwittingly enrolled into 
particular scripts and programmes of action (in the actor network theory sense of the word). These 
scripts and programmes make certain things possible and others not, include certain interests and 
others not (for example the increased use of ATM may have lead to the closure of bank branches 
which exactly excludes those that can not use ATM’s, such as physically disabled people). In this 
sense of use the ethics of machines is very important and is in desperate need of our attention (a 
                                                          
1 I am using the notion of ‘machine’ in a very broad sense here to refer to some form of preconfigured, ‘encapsulated’ or 
‘located’ potential for doing or achieving something not possible without such a machine.  
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good example of this type of work Philip Brey (2000) proposes in his disclosive ethics). However, 
this paper is not primarily concerned with this sense of machine ethics. It is rather concerned with 
the ethics of machines in the sense that Levinas uses the word ethics. For Levinas ethics is being 
arrested by our infinite responsibility toward the Other facing us. Or, differently stated, for Levinas 
the question of ethics is the impossible question of the infinite ethical significance of the Other 
facing us that proceeds, and grounds, all subsequent ethical thinking. Thus, when I am raising the 
question of the ethics of machines I am raising the fundamental question of the ethical significance 
of machines as such, i.e. the question of the weight of our moral responsibility towards machines, 
qua machines.  
In order to develop and structure the discussion I will draw on a particular episode of Star 
Trek titled: “The measure of a man”2. In this episode the ethical significance, and therefore 
subsequent rights, of the android Data becomes contested. This ‘case study’—if I may call it that—
will give us some indication of how the problem of ethical significance of machines can become 
apparent and considered. In discussing this case I will argue that its approach to the issue, as well as 
the work of Levinas, is essentially anthropocentric—ultimately the measure of ethical significance 
is ‘the measure of a man’.  I will argue that it will ultimately fail to provide us with an adequate way 
to consider the ethical significance of machines. I will then proceed to suggest a more radical 
interpretation of Levinas as a possible way forward towards a decentred ethics.     
 
Commander Data and the measure of a man 
Those familiar with Star Trek will know that Commander Data is a highly sophisticated android 
designed by Doctor Noonien Soong. Dr Soong created only one Data in his lifetime. Lieutenant 
Commander Data is now one of the officers on the USS Enterprise, which is part of the Federation’s 
Starfleet. The acclaimed robotics expert Commander Maddox has been authorised by Star Fleet’s 
Admiral Nakamura to remove Data from the USS Enterprise for study, with the intention to refit 
and replicate him. Maddox intends to download Data’s brain into a computer for analysis, and then 
reload a copy back into a refitted and upgraded Data. Due to certain technical complexities the 
procedure is risky and he could not guarantee the end result. Data objects to the procedure by 
claiming that the end result would not be him. He suggests that  “there is an ineffable quality to 
memory that [would not] survive the shutdown of [my] core.” As such he is concerned about the 
continuity of his identity, for him it would be like dying and waking up as somebody else.   
After considering a number of options Data decides to resign as officer of the Starfleet in 
order to prevent the possibility of being disassembled. Commander Maddox responds by arguing 
that Data does not have the freedom to resign since he is a machine and as such the property of the 
Starfleet—a view shared by Admiral Nakamura. He argues that they “would [not] permit the 
computer on the Enterprise to refuse a refit”, why should Data be accorded such a right? The matter 
is referred to Captain Phillipa Louvois of the understaffed local Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) 
office for a decision. After considering the legal position she issues her own summary ruling that 
Data is not a sentient being but mere machine, and therefore, as property of the Federation, lacks the 
legal right either to refuse Maddox’s refit or to resign from the Starfleet.  The USS Enterprise’s 
Commanding Officer, Captain Picard, immediately challenges her decision. Due to resource 
constraints of the JAG office an impromptu hearing is arranged by Captain Phillipa Louvois where 
Captain Picard will defend Data and Commander Riker, the direct subordinate of Captain Picard, 
will represent the Starfleet view that Data is a machine and as such cannot resign or refuse the refit.  
Commander Riker is profoundly disturbed at being placed in this position as his relationship with 
Data leaves him in no doubt as to the status of his colleague and trusted friend. However if he 
refuses Captain Louvois’ ruling will stand, thus, he agrees.  
The court case starts with Commander Riker outlining the case for the Starfleet i.e. that 
Data is a machine and as such cannot resign or refuse the refit 
 
                                                          
2  This paper is based on an early transcript of the episode located at http://www.crosswinds.net/~capttrekker/ 
tsttngetf/sttngs2et/tng135tmoam.htm. 
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RIKER  Your honor, there is only one issue in this case and one relevant piece of 
evidence. I call Lieutenant Commander Data. Data seats himself in the witness 
chair, and places his hand on the scanner.  
COMPUTER VOICE Verify, Lieutenant Commander Data. Current assignment, USS 
Enterprise. Starfleet Command Decoration for... 
RIKER  Your honor, we'll stipulate to all of this.  
PICARD (leaping to his feet) Objection, your honor, I want it read. All of it.  
PHILLIPA Sustained.  
COMPUTER VOICE (resuming) ... Gallantry, Medal of Honor with clusters, Legion of Honor, 
the Star Cross.  
RIKER Commander Data, what are you?  
DATA (looking to Picard for guidance, Picard nods to him to answer) An android.  
RIKER Which is?  
DATA Webster's Twenty-Third Century Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines Android as an 
automaton made to resemble a human being.  
RIKER (musing) An automaton. Made. Made by whom?  
DATA Sir?  
RIKER Who built you, Data?  
DATA Doctor Noonien Soong.  
RIKER And he was?  
DATA The foremost authority in cybernetics. 
RIKER More basic than that. What was he?  
DATA (puzzled, but groping for the right answer; he says questioningly) A human?  
 
***  [He removed Data’s hand after a demonstration of Data’s strength] *** 
 
RIKER (continuing) Data is a physical representation of a dream, an idea conceived of by 
the mind of a man. His purpose? To serve human needs and interests. He is a 
collection of neural nets and heuristic algorithms. His responses are dictated by an 
elaborate software program written by a man. The hardware (slapping the hand [of 
Data] against his palm) was built by a man. [Riker has been preambulating around 
the courtroom, each step bringing him closer to Data. He is now at his side, and 
without warning he leans down, presses the switch, and turns him off. Data 
collapses like a broken toy.] 
RIKER (continuing) And this man has turned him off. Pinocchio is broken, the strings are 
cut. Riker lays the hand down next to Data. Shocked silence fills the room. Picard's 
reaction -- shock and certainty that he cannot win.  
PICARD I request a recess.  
PHILLIPA Granted.  
Riker who, as he walks to his chair, is in agony. A single tear runs down his cheek. He has 
destroyed a friend. 
 
Riker’s argument is simple and clear. Data is a machine, made by a man for serving the purposes of 
man, as such he is subjected to man’s choice—he can be switched off. As a machine he has no 
intrinsic value or significance other than his value to those who made him, his owners. Since they 
wish to replicate and upgrade him they are free to do so.  There is of course an interesting 
contradiction in the proceeding, as hinted by Picard, in that Data has previously been awarded the 
‘Command Decoration for Gallantry’, and medals of honour for services rendered. Presumably such 
distinctions have not been awarded to the computer on the Enterprise. I will take up this issue again 
later on in the paper. 
In his defence Captain Picard realises that he cannot deny the obvious, i.e. that Data is a 
machine, once made by a man. He opens his defence: 
 
PICARD (making his opening statement) Commander Riker has dramatically demonstrated 
to this court that Lieutenant Commander Data is a machine. Do we deny that? No. But how 
is this relevant? We too are machines, just machines of a different type. Commander Riker 
has continually reminded us that Data was built by a human. We do not deny that fact. But 
again how is it relevant? Does construction imply ownership? Children are created from the 
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building blocks of their parents' DNA. Are they property? We have a chance in this hearing 
to severely limit the boundaries of freedom. And I think we better be pretty damn careful 
before we take so arrogant a step.   
 
Picard argues that it is plausible for us to think of ourselves as ‘machines’. It is not whether we are 
or not machines. It is rather the status we attribute to the machine when interacting with it. If we 
award a machine medals are we not implicitly according the machine a sort of autonomy that would 
make it meaningless to award the medals to his designer or to a chair?  Presumably if we award it 
medals we will also hold it, rather than the designer, accountable in the event of a mistake or 
inappropriate behaviour.   
Picard proceeds with his defence with Commander Maddox on the stand. Maddox 
suggested that Data is a machine because he is not sentient. He defines sentience as having 
intelligence, self-awareness and consciousness. He reluctantly agreed that Data seems to conform to 
at least the first two of these. Nevertheless he insists that Picard is sentient and Data not. Picard 
proceeds:   
 
PICARD But you admire him? 
MADDOX Oh yes, it's an outstanding -- 
PICARD (interrupting) Piece of engineering and programming. Yes, you've said that. You've 
devoted your life to the study of cybernetics in general? 
MADDOX Yes. 
PICARD And Data in particular? 
MADDOX Yes. 
PICARD And now you're proposing to dismantle him.  
MADDOX So I can rebuild him and construct more!  
PICARD How many more?  
MADDOX Hundreds, thousands. There's no limit.  
PICARD And do what with them?  
MADDOX Use them.  
PICARD How?  
MADDOX As effective units on Federation ships. As replacements for humans in dangerous 
situations. So much is closed to us because of our fragility. But they...  
PICARD (interrupting; he picks up an object and throws it down a disposal chute) Are 
expendable.  
MADDOX It sounds harsh but to some extent, yes.  
PICARD Are you expendable, Commander Maddox? Never mind. A single Data is a 
curiosity, a wonder, but a thousand Datas, doesn't that become a new race? And aren't we 
going to be judged as a species about how we treat these creations? If they're expendable, 
disposable, aren't we? What is Data?  
MADDOX What? I don't understand.  
PICARD What... is... he?  
MADDOX (angry now and hostile) A machine!  
PICARD Is he? Are you sure?  
MADDOX Yes!  
PICARD But he's met two of your three criteria for sentience, and we haven't addressed the 
third. So we might find him meeting your third criterion, and then what is he?  
MADDOX (driven to his limit) I don't know. I don't know!  
PICARD He doesn't know. (to Phillipa) Do you? That's the decision you're facing. Your 
honor, a courtroom is a crucible. In it we burn away the egos, the selfish desires, the half-
truths, until we're left with the pure product -- a truth -- for all time. Sooner or later it's going 
to happen. This man or others like him are going to succeed in replicating Data. And then 
we have to decide -- what are they? And how will we treat these creations of our genius? 
The decision you reach here today stretches far beyond this android and this courtroom. It 
will reveal the kind of a people we are. And what (points to Data) ... they are going to be. Do 
you condemn then to slavery? Starfleet was founded to seek out new life. (indicating Data) 
Well, there he sits, your honor, waiting on our decision. You have a chance to make law. 
Well, let's make a good one. Let us be wise.  
 5
PHILLIPA This case touches on metaphysics, and that's the province of philosophers and 
poets. Not confused jurists who don't have the answers. But sometimes we have to make a 
stab in the dark, and speak to the future. Is Data a machine? Absolutely. Is he our property? 
No... The courtroom erupts in joy.  
 
It seems to me that there are at least three distinct steps in Picard’s argument for us to consider. 
Firstly, the whole court case is meaningless since the Federation has already confirmed Data’s status 
as more than a ‘mere machine’ since they have place him in a role of responsibility and have 
allocated him certain duties in which they expected him to be accountable. They have also judged 
him to be doing these duties exceedingly well by awarding him medals. Therefore, all their past 
interaction with Data already suggests a status that this case now attempts to deny.   
His second step is to suggest that Data is not a machine but a person since he conforms to 
all the criteria of sentience suggested by Maddox: intelligence, self-awareness and consciousness. 
He gains agreement that Data is intelligent and self-aware, both of which suggests consciousness.  
Although he cannot prove it, the court (and in particular Maddox) can equally not prove that he, 
Picard, possesses all of these, except by some form of intuition. Such intuition would suggest that it 
is evident to any human being that they possess these capacities and therefore other human beings 
should also. However, this intuition would not tell us anything about androids such as Data.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine that we could construct a Turing type test for sentience, and 
that it seems entirely feasible that Data could succeed in passing such a test (based on the evidence 
of Data’s behaviour in the Star Trek series).  However, the most important point in his defence, for 
my argument, is that he takes the measure of ethical significance to be the ‘measure of a man’, i.e. 
machines are ethically significant if they are like us, sentient beings. It would be an interesting 
thought experiment to imagine a world in which the androids were the majority and they would 
decide that, besides sentience, having a ‘reuseable’ body is the ultimate measure of ethical 
significance.  This suggestion points the intimate link between ethics and politics. I will return to 
this matter in the next section.  
The final step in his defence, which draws on the first two, is that ultimately we are going 
to be judged as a species about how we treat these creations of ours; and if they are  “expendable, 
disposable, aren't we?”  This final step is, in my view, the first step towards a non-anthropocentric 
approach to the ethics of machines. This is what I will now turn to. 
 
Ethics beyond the “measure of a man” 
The fundamental problem of the case of the android Data is that the ethical landscape is already 
colonised by humans. We humans have seized the ethical discourse and turned it into our language, 
for our purposes. In this ethical landscape it becomes impossible for Data to state his case unless it 
is made in our terms—terms such as ‘machine’, ‘property’, ‘sentience’, etc.  It is us humans that are 
making the decisions about the validity, or not, of any criteria or category for establishing ethical 
significance. It is Data that is on trial not we humans. For example we often take ‘sentience’ as 
criteria for considering ethical significance worth because we argue that it is a necessary condition 
for feeling of pain. Why should pain be a criterion? Is it because we can feel pain?  Are not all our 
often suggested criteria such as originality, uniqueness, sentience, rationality, autonomy, and so 
forth, not somehow always already based on that which we by necessity comply with?  
However, the problem is not the particular criteria we choose but that we tend to choose it 
in our terms to favour our interests. Furthermore, in choosing criteria we set up a hierarchy of 
ethical significance in which some are more valuable than others from the start. For example on the 
USS Enterprise it is the humans whose significance is beyond dispute, then there are valuable 
androids like Data, and then there are quite valuable machines like the onboard computer, and 
finally there are the not so significant equipment such as chairs. Such hierarchies, and we can easily 
construct many of these, are quite intuitive and seems very reasonable—at least to us humans. It is 
clear that a human is ethically more significant than a dog and a dog more than a stone. Who would 
disagree with that?  I would if I was a stone and I could speak in human terms. However, since I 
cannot I am doomed to remain at the disposal of humans. My ‘otherness’ is rendered equal by their 
value categories. In their terms they can dispose of me—physically and ethically—in whatever way 
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they want. It seems that it is only when non-humans ‘object’ in human terms that they take notice. 
For example we now consider the ozone because in ignoring its ‘objections’ we will become 
damaged ourselves, we will literally feel it on our skin.  
It seems to me there are at least two anthropocentric reasons why an anthropocentric ethics 
will ultimately fail. The first reason is the problem this paper started with, namely, that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to draw definitive boundaries between our machines and us (as 
suggested by the work in STS and ANT). In fact one could argue, as some do, that these boundaries 
never existed in the first instance (Haraway, 1991). They argue that neither our machines nor we 
ever function in isolation from each other. Rather, our machines and us draw upon each other for 
our being what we are. We are, as members of society, mostly configured in complex ‘networks’ in 
which a certain mutual dependence and symmetry of interaction is required for its smooth operation.  
The second reason, related to the first, is that by considering machines as mere resources in the 
network we, also in the network, equally become viewed as mere resources.  In Picard’s words  if 
they are “expendable, disposable, aren't we?”  This ‘boundary ambiguity’ is dramatically illustrated 
in the case of Data. In the normal functioning of the USS Enterprise everybody treated Data ‘as if’ 
he was ‘a human’. They gave him duties, expected him to keep his word, befriended him, etc. 
However, when he objected to the refit, they suddenly wanted to draw a ethically significant 
boundary (machine/person), which they have already denied in their normal everyday interaction 
with Data.  Thus, the irony of an anthropocentric ethics of machines is that ultimately we already 
deny, or at least erode, its validity in a system in which we are all already more or less configured as 
‘machines’ in programmes and scripts driven forth by its own internal logic. The ethical 
significance we accord machines effectively becomes the ethical significance we ourselves acquire.  
In the complex social network of everyday life other humans and our machines also ‘objectify’ us. 
For example I cannot get my money out from the bank machine because I forgot my PIN number. 
Until I identify myself in its terms (as a five digit number) I do not exist. Equally if I cannot prove 
my identity by presenting inscribed objects (passport, drivers licence) I cannot get a new PIN 
number. In Heidegger’s (1977 ) words we all become ‘standing reserve’, on ‘stand by’ for the 
purposes of the network. The value hierarchy presumed never existed in the first place. The fate of 
our machines is also our fate. The ‘otherness’ we claimed, and denied others, is in fact denied to all. 
What now?  
We all—humans, machines and stones alike—need a decentring of ethics—all things in 
their own terms from themselves.  What would the content of such an ethics be? Taylor (1986) 
argues that an entity is ethically significant if it has an “intrinsic value”. By this he means entities 
that have ‘a good of its own’ and who’s flourishing would be considered to be a good thing. One 
can ask who will be the judge of the ‘good’ referred to? Not in the easy cases but in the very 
difficult cases where we have to choose between competing ‘goods’.   Luciano Floridi (2003) 
argues that Taylor does not go far enough, that we can indeed define a minimalist category of moral 
worth by a using the very abstract category of “information object” in which things like sentience 
and biological life would be incidental and local particulars. I will not attempt to explain here the 
definition of an ‘information object’ that he uses as that will require more space than is available.  
However, one can ask why ‘information’? Is it because we already value information? Is it because 
we see in information structure, coherency and order (as suggested in information theory) and not 
chaos, which we may not want to value?  As brave and laudable as the efforts of Taylor and Floridi 
may be, and they are, one could question whether these attempts really escape the sphere of the 
anthropocentric. Obviously one can ask whether it is at all possible for us humans to escape our own 
prejudices? Furthermore, it seems that every attempt to define a common ethical category for all 
things will fail, as it will itself already violate every entity by exactly denying its Otherness3—by 
comparing what is absolutely incomparable.  
In contrast to these attempts this paper suggests that ethics will only have a possibility to 
happen if we actively distance ourselves from the assumption of a need for a definitive ethical 
                                                          
3  In the discussion to follow I use Otherness (with a capital ‘C’) to suggest the notion of other that is more than 
mere difference. In other words an Other that is other than any difference whatsoever that we may be able to suggest and 
construct, i.e. radically and absolutely Other. In this regard I follow Levinas (1996).  
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category to ground ethics. When we embrace an ethical imperative in which we let things be ‘what 
they are’ in their Otherness. Thus, an ethics that take the always already Otherness of the other as its 
guide (as suggested by Levinas(1991))—nothing more and nothing less.  A decentred ethics 
requires that all things are equally worthy of ethical consideration from the start.  This does not, 
however, mean that a human being is simply equal to a chair in ethical significance. It is not a call 
for the “Royal Society for the Protection of Chairs”.  It is rather a profound and humble admission 
that we cannot compare ethically a person to a stone without violating the Otherness of both.  
Neither are we suggesting that we anthropomorphise things—‘make’ them like us—as was done in 
the case of Data.  Rather, it is the argument of this paper that we need not, and ought not attempt to 
draw these boundaries; attempting to draw these boundaries, even very carefully, or making them 
like us, is exactly our first and violent transgression of the radically Otherness of all things. Indeed, 
we need an ethics of machines that is more than a set of ‘rules’ or principles for moral decision-
making. Moral decision-making need as its ‘ground’, not a system for comparison, but rather a 
recognition of the impossibility of all comparison—every comparison is already violent.   What this 
paper is calling for, if ethics is to happen, is to abandon these attempts at moral ordering, through 
boundary making and morphing (them into us or us into them), and to let things be, what they are, 
in themselves, in their terms, for their sake. The always already Otherness of the other is what 
moves ethics (Levinas, 1996).   
One may respond by claiming that such an ethical imperative leaves us in a dead-end with 
nowhere to go. Yes, it does leave one on uncertain ground and that is exactly its strength. It is when 
we believe that we have ‘sorted’ ethics out that violence is already present. However, its when we 
become unsure, when we are full of questions, when our categories fails us, and we need to think 
afresh, start all over again, that it becomes possible for us to be open to the questioning appeal of the 
otherness of the Other. Where does this leave us? What do we concretely do?  I will suggest that a 
decentred ethics could be based on, but not limited to, the following aporia4:  
• The suspension of the law 
• Letting the Other speak 
• Undecidability  
• Justice. 
 
Derrida (1992) suggests that it is when we suspend the law (categories and codes) to make a ‘fresh’ 
judgement, that ethics becomes possible. If the possibility of becoming disturbed by the other as 
Other becomes circumvented by the self-evidence of the category, code, reasons, etc., then the law 
becomes a law onto itself—pure violence. In the case of Data the category remained in tact in many 
interacting ways. It was Data that was on trial. It was evident to everybody that he was the ‘lesser’ 
machine and that they had the right to decide his fate. Their right to decide did not come up for 
consideration. Furthermore, once the court case started his friends ironically believed that his moral 
worth was in being ‘like them’. They did not suspend their categories of ‘machine’, ‘person’ and 
‘sentience’ and asked the question “what is it about Data, as Data, that we value”.  One can most 
certainly question whether Data really did find ‘justice’ in being spared because he was almost like 
them? 
Levinas, suggests that it is in speaking that the other reveals itself as Other. For Levinas 
speaking is the showing of the Other of itself from itself as always already Other (Levinas, 1991).  
Do we actively encourage the others to speak? Of course Levinas was talking about other humans, 
but what about our machines and nature? Do they not speak when they break down as we attempt to 
domesticate them? Do we listen? In ethical discourse do we actively seek exceptional speaking? Do 
we actively seek for breakdowns and differences that unsettle rather than confirm our categories? 
Ethics will happen only if we become unsettled by the voice of the Other.  Data never got the 
opportunity to speak—except in answering their questions. However outside the court he did speak. 
When confronted by Maddox about his resignation he said: “I am the culmination of one man's 
                                                          
4  I use the term ‘aporia’ as Derrida does to indicate the double meaning of something that is both an expression of 
doubt and a perplexing difficulty.   
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dream. This is not ego or vanity, but when Doctor Soong created me he added to the substance of 
the universe. If by your experiments I am destroyed, something unique and wonderful will be lost.”  
Data is claiming that it is exactly his Otherness that is at stake here. Should the court case not have 
focused on this? 
The reality of ethical situation is that eventually a decision has to be made—one way or the 
other. This decision is mostly required urgently.  Ethics does not have the luxury of time to think 
about all the alternative, weigh them carefully and come to a reasoned, justifiable outcome. We can 
obviously talk and reason but in the final instance the decision is now, yet it is undecidable. There 
can simply be no final reckoning, no squaring of all the books. The agonising that accompanies 
every ethical decision already suggests that every decision is also already a transgression. However, 
when we do make a decision should we not immediately and simultaneously declare the inherent 
uncertainty and exceptional nature of the decision? It seems to me that in a decentred ethics there is 
a need to announce and remain open to the possibility that we got it wrong. There is a need to 
announce that ethical decisions are wrought with uncertainty. There is no doubt that Data’s case is a 
difficult one. What about all the people that may in future lose their lives because there is not a Data 
available? What about the knowledge lost to the Federation? And we may add many more.  We 
cannot speculate about how the case would have turned out had they followed a decentred ethics. 
Nevertheless, what seems to be a victory for Data is not necessary so. By avoiding the agony of an 
undecidable decision all Others have become violated.  For ethics to happen we must also declare 
immediately that there are an innumerable other Others equally deserving of our attention and 
resources. Ethics immediately and simultaneously implicates politics, the question of justice 
(Critchley, 1999). By circumventing ethics the participants in the court case have also committed an 
injustice to all. Yes, ethics is impossible!    
 
Conclusion 
What now? In considering a decentred ethics we have multiplied many times over our moral 
responsibility. Not only are we always already responsible for the other human being that we 
encounter, we are also always already responsible for every other thing (machine or otherwise).  Not 
only must we face the face of the destitute we must also face the fragility of all things we encounter. 
Moreover, we are in an impossible situation where we have to continually “compare the 
incomparable”. The hierarchy of values can no longer ‘simplify’ ethics for us. Not that it did. 
However, it did give us a way to justify ourselves: “it was just a such and such a thing after all”. As 
Latour points out, “we have never been modern”. The tidiness of our value hierarchy masked the 
moral complexity we dared not face.  Ethics is impossible! Yes, and so it should be. The 
insurmountable weight of our ethical responsibility is exactly what gives ethics its force (Levinas, 
1991(1974)). It is exactly the impossibility that leads us to keep decisions open, to reconsider again 
and again our choices. To live a moral life is to live in the continued shadow of doubt, without hope 
for certainty. If we reduce ethics to tidy hierarchies of value then ethics becomes a mere moral 
calculation—not that we should not calculate and (re)consider—but this ought to happen with ‘fear 
and trembling’ as Kierkegaard suggested. Clearly we must make very difficult choices on an 
everyday basis. However, what make these choices difficult—even always impossible—are 
precisely the impossibility of our categories, boundaries and hierarchies, and the infinity of our 
responsibilities. It is in the shadow of this infinite responsibility that we must work out, instance by 
instance, again and again, how we ought to live, with all Other (things). This is the task of a 
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